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ERITIS SICUT DEUS: MORAL THEORY AND
THE SIN OF PRIDE
Gilbert Meilaender
The fundamental temptation, especially for those who are serious about the
moral life, is always the same: failing in trust, to want to be like God, knowing
good and evil. "What the serpent has in mind," Karl Barth has written, "is the
establishment of ethics. "1 This is an overstatement, but it points us toward an
important truth.
The number of possible moral theories is not large, though their varieties are
infinitely complex. C. S. Lewis has a simple illustration which directs attention
to the features of life that any moral theory must consider.
Think of us as a fleet of ships sailing in formation. The voyage will be
a success only, in the first place, if the ships do not collide and get in
one another's way; and, secondly, if each ship is seaworthy and has
her engines in good order. As a matter of fact, you cannot have either
of these two things without the other. If the ships keep on having
collisions they will not remain seaworthy very long. On the other hand,
if their steering gears are out of order they will not be able to avoid
collisions . . . . But there is one thing we have not yet taken into
account. We have not asked where the fleet is trying to get to ....
And however well the fleet sailed, its voyage would be a failure if it
were meant to reach New York and actually arrived at Calcutta. 2
The analogy suggests three considerations which are important in morality:
(1) We judge actions as right or wrong (just as we know that the ships must not
collide and get in each other's way), and we may think of human beings as
having a right not to be wronged in certain ways.
(2) We judge character, evaluating not just the rightness or wrongness of actions
but also the goodness or badness of agents (just as we know that the engines
and steering gears of the ships must be in good order).
(3) We evaluate the results of action, the goals at which action aims and the
values it seeks to realize (just as we must know whether the ship's destination
is New York or Calcutta).
Now, in fact, any ethical theory we develop will try to take account of all
three features of the moral life; yet, the distinctive shape of an ethic will depend
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largely on which of the three it makes central. Because this is true, it has become
commonplace to distinguish three different kinds of moral theories (each of
which has its adherents). A consequentialist ethic makes the results or consequences of action central in our moral deliberations. A perfectionist ethic
emphasizes the character of the agent, the way in which our actions both shape
and flow from the person we are, both develop and enact character. 3 A deontological ethic evaluates action more than character but emphasizes the shape of the
act itself: not what happens (as consequentialists emphasize) but what the agent
does.
For a consequentialist theory the moral agent is essentially a public functionary
whose responsibility it is to evaluate from an impersonal standpoint the worth
of possible states of affairs and, then, to seek the best overall outcome available.
What the agent does is not what counts most morally. What counts is that he is
in service of the best state of affairs possible. Perhaps the most illuminating way
to describe consequentialism is this: It holds that an ought to do follows from
an ought to be. If it ought to be the case that no one suffer horribly while dying,
I (and we) ought to do whatever is necessary to minimize such suffering, even
if on some occasions that means aiming to kill in an act of euthanasia. By
contrast, a deontological theory makes it possible (though not necessary) to hold
that I ought not euthanatize the suffering person even if doing so would result
in the best state of affairs on the whole. The difference between the two views
can be put this way: If I were to do this, "things would be better, what happened
would be better .... But I would have done something worse."4
This suggests that the important distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories involves the kind of responsibility ascribed to the moral agent.
Does the agent adopt a universal (and therefore impersonal) standpoint, regarding
his own life as would an observer and obligated to achieve all the good he can?
Or does the agent seek to act in a particular way and be a person of a certain
sort, not ignoring the consequences but also not believing himself fully responsible
for achieving the best possible outcome? This way of putting the matter suggests
that our threefold division of moral theories needs to be revised. The crucial
classification is twofold.
There are some ethical theories--deontological or perfectionist in characterwhich do not ask the moral agent to step out of his finite location in nature and
history to be more than a human being bearing a real but limited responsibility
for overall outcomes. These theories accept the moral importance of the agent's
perspective-the importance of what he is and does, not just of what his doing
brings about. To be sure, such theories, if they are to be adequate to our experience, can never ignore the results of action. Nor can they permit us to make
moral judgments which represent only our personal perspective. The virtue of
justice and the requirement that we act justly are, for example, both grounded
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in an understanding of the human person not only as finite but also as free. Free
to transcend at least to some extent our limited, partial perspective in order to
be fair to others. To refuse to exercise such freedom, to refuse to see the world
in this way, is the sin of sloth. 5 The freedom by which human nature is enabled
to transcend its particular location means that we can and must consider what
is required of us from the perspective of God, before whom all human beings
are equal and in whom all are united.
But we are not free to try to be like God. And some moral theories seem to
seek a standpoint more divine than human. Such theories---chiefly consequentialist, but also and interestingly, Kantian-in their search for an objective and
impersonal perspective ask us to make moral judgments about the world from
a position nowhere within that world. They ask us to wiIl universally or accept
responsibility for trying to produce the best overall outcome. Such theories are
rooted in a sin still more fundamental than sloth: our prideful attempt to free
ourselves from our finite location within nature and history.
It is perhaps no accident that one of the most powerful and influential ethical
theories of the modern period-Kant's-has taught us to wiII as moral maxims
only those which could be adopted as universal law. It has encouraged us to
think that our glory lies in being free and autonomous, obeying no law except
that which we legislate for ourselves in accordance with the universal requirements
of reason-has encouraged us, in short, to develop a moral theory for beings
who are all freedom and no finitude. Not without reason did Iris Murdoch write
that "Kant's man had already received a glorious incarnation nearly a century
earlier in the work of Milton: his proper name is Lucifer."6
That the twofold classification of moral theories suggested above really does
illuminate something important can be seen in the ease with which some have
managed to transform a Kantian ethic-usually described as deontological-into
a consequentialist ethic. R. M. Hare's "universal prescriptivism" offers a contemporary version of a Kantian ethic. In making a moral decision, Hare contends,
we are seeking a judgment which we would be willing to prescribe universaIlywilling to regard as binding upon any person in similar circumstances. (Interestingly, Hare calls this the "archangel" level of moral thinking. But angels are not
constrained by the limits that bind human beings.) How do we know whether
we would be willing to make such a judgment in all similar situations? By
seeking imaginatively to occupy, in turn, the positions of all other who are
involved in the situation-seeking to determine whether we would be willing to
occupy their position on another occasion. In this way we discover what is "best,
all in all, for all the parties." And, Hare notes, "we see here how the utilitarians
and Kant get synthesized."7 But this idea of taking into oneself the desires and
sufferings of the world, feeling even if only imaginatively all its pains and
pleasures as equally close to oneself-this move which enables Hare to transform
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the fonnal Kantian urge to will universally into the material consequentialist
search for the best overall outcome, is a project which perhaps even an archangel
ought not undertake. Unless, that is, he prefers to reign in hell than serve in
heaven.
This project is best exemplified and most fruitfully examined in consequentialist
theory, and to it we now tum. Utilitarianism, now commonly regarded as one
species of consequentialism, was the first great example of such a theory. Classical
utilitarians sought to rank possible outcomes according to the amount of pleasure
or satisfaction they offered the people involved, and they required the moral
agent to seek to produce the best overall (or, least bad) state of affairs. If we
abandon the utilitarian notion that good outcomes can be described solely in
tenns of pleasure or satisfaction, we will speak more generally of maximizing
good consequences (however characterized). 'Consequentialism' is therefore a
wider label and more general description of this sort of theory than is
'utilitarianism.' Why might one be attracted to such a theory?

I: The Lure of Consequentialism
The power of a consequentialist moral theory comes in large part from the
fact that "it is the major recognized nonnative theory incorporating the deeply
plausible-sounding feature that one may always do what would lead to the best
available outcome overall. "X This philosopher's fonnula has the kind of otherregarding ring which Christians are accustomed to praise, and we may be tempted
to believe that there must be little difference between an act which maximizes
good consequences and an act that is most loving. Indeed, the power of consequentialist theory-at least within our culture-may be in large part a result of the
fact that it sounds like a secularized version of the Christian love command. It
is, as I will suggest later, a quite natural theory for those who remain morally
serious but who have lost or left behind the Christian framework which gave
content and specification to the command to love one's neighbor.
As a way of seeing how attractive such language may be-how strongly it
may tug on the hearts of those committed to self-sacrificial love of neighbor-and
in order to suggest the most important problems a consequentialist ethic faces,
we will begin with the straightforward and readily accessible philosophical language of an earlier day. The Englishman William Godwin, now largely forgotten
but in his day (near the close of the 18th century) a well known philosophical
anarchist, developed what we may call a consequentialist theory of morality in
his provocative Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. 9
Godwin explains that he will use the tenn 'justice' to signify all our moral
duty, and he means this rigorously indeed. "If justice have any meaning, it is
just that I should contribute everything in my power to the benefit of the whole"
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(p. 40). Or again, "it is just that I should do all the good in my power" (p. 45).
So exacting a conception of our moral duty has its appeal, but it will immediately
suggest two questions to the mind of any thoughtful person. How shall we
reconcile this understanding of justice with our sense that we are obligated
especially to those who stand in certain special relations to us, that we cannot
regard them simply as parts of the whole we are to benefit? And, how shall we
reconcile this conception of moral duty with our sense that it is important to see
to our own needs and, even, our own pleasures, not simply to think of ourselves
as acting at all times in service of the general wellbeing? Godwin tackles each
of these problems with characteristic vigor.
Suppose, he writes, a fire should break out in the palace of Fenelon, archbishop
of Cambrai, while he is at work on his Telemachus. Suppose the fire endangers
the life of Fenelon and of his chambermaid, but we can save only one. Because
we are connected "in some sense with the whole family of mankind," it seems
obvious to Godwin that "that life ought to be preferred which will be most
conducive to the general good" (p. 41).
Supposing the chambermaid had been my wife, my mother, or my
benefactor. This would not alter the truth of the proposition. The life
of Fenelon would still be more valuable than that of the chambermaid;
and justice . . . would still have preferred that which was most valuable .... What magic is there in the pronoun "my" to overturn the
decision of everlasting truth? (p. 42)
Someone might object that gratitude should lead me to prefer my mother, the
chambermaid, to Fenelon. After all, she has endured considerable pain on my
behalf and had nourished my life when it was entirely dependent on her. Godwin
admits that gratitude is owed for every voluntary kindness, but it is owed simply
because such kindness is virtuous and deserves respect. The fact that a particular
kindness was bestowed on me is of no moral importance. The act of kindness
is equally meritorious "whether the benefit was conferred upon me or upon
another" (p. 42). Hence, in his attempt to eliminate the magic from the word
'my,' Godwin arrives at the puzzling notion that someone else might owe gratitude
to my benefactor and I to someone else's. "My benefactor ought to be esteemed,
not because he bestowed a benefit upon me, but because he bestowed it upon a
human being" (p. 43). Godwin grants that, as things stand at present, our closest
companions will often get the larger share of our gratitude; for we lack the ability
to make the needed universal discriminations, and we will inevitably think those
kindnesses we have experienced to come from the most deserving benefactors.
But this admitted fact "is founded only in the present imperfection of human
nature" (p. 43).
What of the other problem? If moral duty requires "that I should contribute
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everything in my power to the benefit of the whole," where will time and energy
be found for the personal undertakings that add delight to life-for good books
and friends, enjoyment of sunrise and sunset, time spent in vocations which
please but do relatively little to enhance the "general weal"? This question
Godwin takes up by asking about the "degree" to which we must seek the good
of others. In particular, what sort of sacrifices on our own behalf may be required?
"And here I say that it is just that I should do all the good in my power" (p.
45). Godwin grants, for example, a right to private property. But this is to be
regarded entirely as a trust. "He has no right to dispose of a shilling of it at the
will of his caprice. So far from being entitled to well-earned applause for having
employed some scanty pittance in the service of philanthropy, he is in the eye
of justice a delinquent if he withheld any portion from that service" (p. 46). Or
again, with respect to our vocational choices, he writes: "I am bound to employ
my talents, my understanding, my strength and my time for the production of
the greatest quantity of general good. Such are the declarations of justice, so
great is the extent of my duty" (p. 46). And thus again, in order to eliminate
the magic of the word 'my,' Godwin has eliminated something of central importance to human life-the possibility of undeserved generosity and a self-sacrifice
that is praiseworthy because not obligatory. "It is therefore impossible for me
to confer upon any man a favour, I can only do him a right" (p. 47).
There is much in Godwin's language that might appeal to one nurtured on
Christian talk of love for the neighbor. The search for a perspective from which
the seeming arbitrariness of personal preference will be eliminated; the readiness
to bring our every thought and action under the rule of love; the sense that, since
the neighbor may be anyone, the neighbor must be everyone and our task must
be to maximize wellbeing-all these have been thought to be implications of
Christian love. But if the hands are Esau's, the voice is Jacob's. To imagine
that Christian agape can be equated with the impersonal attempt to maximize
good consequences is to be deceived-tempted and overcome by a seductive but
false imitation of love. We can begin to see this if we consider more fully the
two problems we noted in Godwin's discussion. Both have to do, though in
different ways, with the place ofJreedom in the Christian life. (1) Are there any
limits on our freedom to seek what is good for others? (2) Are we ever free from
the obligation to measure our action by the standard of general wellbeing?
That reflection about the Christian life cannot avoid these two questions can
be seen if we consider the seemingly simple commandments of the Decalog, to
which Christians have returned for guidance in generation after generation. Considered simply as moral rules, each of the ten will need to be made more
complicated and complex; exception clauses and more precise characterizations
will have to be added. But in their context they are something more than rulesthey are a short picture of what it means to trust God. For the God who here
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commands identifies himself as the redeemer, the One who has delivered his
people from bondage. 10 The commandments of the first table of the law call for
trust in this God; those of the second table specify how those who trust God to
accomplish his saving purposes must treat their neighbors. These commandments
of the second table concern themselves with five bonds that are necessary for
human life together: (1) the bond of the family, (2) the bond of marriage, (3)
the bond of life with life, (4) the bond of persons and property, (5) the bond
connecting the person and the person's speech, which makes speech a manifestation of the self.
These commandments do two things: they set limits to our action and they
demarcate a sphere of "the permitted." Luther captures this quite nicely in his
Small Catechism's brief explanations of the commandments of the second table.
He articulates both the limit and the permission. Thus, for example, he defines
the commandment which binds life with life in this way: "We should fear and
love God that we may not hurt nor harm our neighbor in his body, but help and
befriend him in every bodily need." Some actions-which, of course, may have
to be specified in rather precise detail-hurt and harm the neighbor. They should
not be done, and, so, our freedom is limited. We are not even to seek the good
of some by transgressing these limits and wronging others-not if we are willing
to trust God to be the deliverer he has claimed to be. But to respect these limits
is not to do all the command asks. The limits-important though they are for
human life and even if they were fully observed--do no more than mark out for
us the immense expanse of life in which we are set free to serve the neighbor.
If not in the ways prohibited by the commandments, if those ways cannot be
called love for the neighbor, then in what ways? That is the task the commandments of the second table set for us. If God can be trusted to care for us, the
energy that we might have devoted to that cause is set free for service in countless
ways which love finds but law cannot command. We are set free to help and
befriend the neighbor in every bodily need. And the very open-ended nature of
that task could be thought to be an injunction always to seek what is best for
the largest number of neighbors. Hence, Luther's explanations of the commandments raise for us the same two questions we found in Godwin, and they cut to
the heart of the meaning of Christian freedom.
The basic issue is this: Must we always do whatever will lead to the best
available outcome? Does an ought to do necessarily flow from an ought to be?
There are two reasons for denying that it does. Each makes central what the
agent is and does, not just what happens as a result of his action. Each thinks
of the person as something other than simply a servant of the general good. Each
adopts the perspective of the agent rather than the impersonal perspective of no
particular person at all. Samuel Scheffler has characterized these reasons in terms
of an agent-centered prerogative and an agent-centered restriction. That is,
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perhaps (as Scheffler thinks) we are sometimes permitted to pursue our own
projects rather than the general good. And perhaps (as Scheffler doubts) we are
sometimes prohibited from adopting a necessary means to the best available
outcomes. II Thomas Nagel uses different language but has in mind the same two
challenges to consequentialism. He discusses reasons of autonomy, which grow
out of our desires, commitments, and projects, and deontological reasons, which
set limits to the ways in which we are permitted to pursue good states of affairs.
Both of these, Nagel believes, provide good reasons for doubting that we must
always do what is (impersonally considered) for the best. 12 Thus, Scheffler thinks
we need not always seek the greatest good possible, but that we may do so if
we wish. Nagel thinks we need not always seek the greatest good possible, and,
sometimes, must not. Interestingly, neither philosopher is particularly puzzled
by the notion that we need not always do what is for the best; they find the
agent's prerogative to pursue (some of the time) his own projects rather than the
general good to be easily understandable. It is grounded in the person's autonomy
or need for personal independence. But both philosophers are puzzled by the
idea that we might sometimes be prohibited from seeking the best outcome even
if we wanted to. Even Nagel, who argues in favor of such a restriction on our
freedom to seek the good, grants that it may seem "primitive, even superstitious. "13
And Scheffler simply admits that he can find no justification for such a restriction.
For Christian ethics, by contrast, it may prove harder to justify the prerogative
than the restriction-harder to justify any limit on our obligation to do good than
to justify limits on our freedom to seek the good of others.
II: Freedom From the Pursuit of Good Consequences?
John Finnis has written of the "secret, often unconscious legalism" of consequentialist moral theory: "its assumption that there is a uniquely correct moral
answer (or specifiable set of correct moral answers) to all genuine moral problems."14 Should Finnis be right it will follow that, if we interpret the love
command as a command always to seek the best overall outcome, we will destroy
the freedom of the Christian life. One way of putting this-it would be Scheffler's
way- is to say that consequential ism demands too much of us, leaves no room
for personal autonomy. It moralizes the whole of life-making every decision
a moment of obligation and requiring us always to seek what is best overall. It
is better, though, to say not that consequentialism asks too much but that it asks
the wrong thing of us. It asks us to think of love apart from trust-to imagine
that the destiny of the world lies not in God's hand but in ours. It interposes
between us and God a moral theory which destroys our freedom to hear in
different ways God's call to delight in the creation and serve the neighbor's
need. It makes us public functionaries, servants of the general good, and thereby
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destroys the goal of Christian existence as life in God-a union in love of those
who are different, who hear the call of God addressed to them personally and
see the beauty of God with a vision peculiarly theirs.
An obligation to love separated from the freedom to trust in God's providential
care makes life a heavy burden indeed; for then we constantly bear the godlike
responsibility of providing in our every action for the general wellbeing. The
consequentialist must be a stern moralist; each action must be weighed and
calculated to determine whether it really fosters the greatest good. To play with
one's child, walk with one's love, read a book, write a friend, work in a garden,
devote long hours to a work of art or craftsmanship, spend one's talents in a
small and narrow circle-all such possibilities given in the particular time and
place that is ours will (on this theory) require justification from the impersonal
standpoint of universal wellbeing. And even if we think such justification possible, a task taken up for that reason can never be the same. "The unbought grace
of life" is missed when obligation replaces freedom.
Pointing out that utilitarianism "seems to require a more comprehensive and
unceasing subordination of self-interest to the common good" than rival moral
theories, Henry Sidgwick called attention to a fact Mill had noted: Although
utilitarianism was sometimes criticized as being base and vulgar (because it made
maximization of pleasure central), the more plausible charge was that it set too
high a standard and demanded too much. 15 It is worth noting, once more, that
from the Christian perspective the point must be made differently. For if love
bears and endures all things, any limit on our obligation to seek what is best on
the whole cannot finally be grounded in a supposed claim to autonomy or personal
independence. If there is such a limit, it is grounded, rather, in the nature we
have been given: created by God to inhabit a particular location in nature and
history. Free to some extent to transcend that location, required to some extent
to transcend it-but not to forget that ours is the freedom of a finite, dependent
body. To imagine that it is our responsibility to adopt a more universal standpoint
than this is to want to be like God-and to fail in trust.
And, indeed, when we attempt this in moral theory, the results are very
peculiar. Sidgwick considers in some detail a kind of practical perplexity confronting consequentialist theory. The theory enjoins us always to act in such a
way as to seek the greatest good overall. But many pleasures-which would,
presumably, contribute to a good outcome---can be experienced only if we do
not aim at them. Remembering Godwin, we may use gratitude as our example.
Perhaps what is best for all is that each of us spontaneously express gratitude
to our benefactors. Perhaps this will lead to a better outcome on the whole than
if we distribute gratitude to those who are in fact the greatest benefactors of
humanity. For if we do as Godwin recommends we will lose the peculiar pleasure
that comes (to both giver and recipient) from the experience of spontaneous and
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uncalculated gratitude. Godwin is prepared to argue: "Would not the most beneficial consequences result from a different plan; from my constantly and carefully
enquiring into the deserts of all those with whom I am connected, and from their
being sure, after a certain allowance for the fallibility of human judgment, of
being treated by me exactly as they deserved? Who can tell what would be the
effects of such a plan of conduct universally adopted?"16 Who can tell-but then,
who would wish to make the experiment? Sidgwick certainly did not. Instead,
he suggests that most of us, most of the time, ought not try to live each moment
as if we were consequentialists. Most of the time we should be moved to act by
ordinary human impulses rather than the desire to achieve what is best overall;
for, he notes, "each person is for the most part, from limitations either of power
or knowledge, not in a position to do much good to more than a very small
number of persons; it therefore seems, on this ground alone, desirable that his
chief benevolent impulses should be correspondingly limited. "10. Sidgwick here
puts his finger on the important issue, but he misunderstands its significance-as
if the problem were that the consequentialist merely set too high a standard for
human beings. It is as if we should give a grudging acquiescence to our finite
nature while taking no real account of it in moral theory. Or it is, we might say,
as if a parent were to be like a public functionary, charged with looking after a
certain number of members of the body politic. What is needed, by contrast, is
a glad affirmation of our finite nature and trust that we are free to be the sort
of creatures God has made us.
Put most generally, the problem is that to aim in all one's action at producing
the best outcome overall would surely make life worse; for it would-to mention
only what is obvious-remove the great good of spontaneity from life. To deal
with this problem consequentialists inevitably find themselves suggesting that
things will be better if people do not always aim directly at the greatest good-that
is, if they do not always act as if they believed consequentialist moral theory!
One result of this is to create division and incoherence within the self. 17 For we
have adopted a moral theory which is very difficult to act upon. The reasons for
action which the theory offers cannot take flesh in the motives which move us.
Adopting momentarily an impartial perspective, we can use the theory to approve
or disapprove our life, but we cannot really live it. We are divided within between
the person who acts and the person who theorizes. 18 A more important result
must be the creation of division not within but among selves--division between
those who can rise to the impersonal standpoint of an objective calculator of
general wellbeing and those for whom it is better to act without such reflection.
And, of course, since those in the first group know that it will be better on the
whole if those in the second group do not try to act as consequentialists, the
theory takes on a highly manipulative cast. With better reason than he thinks
Hare terms these two levels the archangels and the proles. A theory which calls
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upon the moralist to take responsibility for what is best overall creates divisionboth within us and among us. This should be no surprise, since this is what
Christians believe the sin of pride always does. Hare adds: "If we do not think
men can do it, we shall have to invoke a Butlerian God to do it for us, and
reveal the results through our consciences."!9 This alternative clearly has little
appeal for Hare, but we shall return to it later.
Christian love does not, therefore, require that we seek in every moment to
achieve what is best overall. It interposes no moral theory between us and the
call of God and leaves us free to take up our callings with glad and trusting
hearts. We love when we serve the neighbors whom our vocation places before
us. Now, to be sure, this argument for limited responsibility is not an argument
simply for "my station and its duties." We are finite; but we are also free, not
limited entirely by our place within nature and history. Hence, Einar Billing has
suggested that "the call constantly has to struggle against two adversaries:
stereotyped workmanship and unresponsible idealism."20 If the heart that trusts
God does not seek unlimited responsibility for what is best, neither can it be
closed to new possibilities for love which may be given it. Such decisions are
always personal and particular. They cannot be made for anyone else. They
cannot be willed universally for all similarly situated people. They cannot be
made from an impersonal, objective standpoint that is nowhere in particular-for
we never hear the call of God except at the place where we stand. In making
such decisions we discover who we are and will be-and we are never solely
servants of the general good.
III: Freedom for the Pursuit of Good Consequences?
The argument of the previous section was that Christians need not always seek
what is best overall. They are free from the tyranny of consequentialist theory.
But another problem remains. Are there occasions when Christians not only may
not but also ought not seek the best overall result in their action? Are there
restrictions on our freedom to seek the good? This is the question posed especially
by deontological ethics, the question which seemed so puzzling to Nagel and
Scheffler.
One could not ask for a more resounding answer than the one furnished by
Newman in a famous sentence, couched in his intricate prose:
The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and moon to drop from
heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die
of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than
that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one
single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, or should steal one
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poor farthing without excuse. 21

Here indeed is a man who believes that an ought to do will not necessarily follow
from an ought to be. It is quite clear that for Newman the focus of the moral
life is what we do, not what happens as a result of our doing.
Newman's statement is worth considering because, precisely by its very boldness and straightforwardness, it calls forth an obvious objection. How can we
claim the name 'love' for the kind of action he describes? In Silence, Shusaku
Endo's novel about Japanese Christians suffering persecution for their faith, the
protagonist must make such a decision. A priest, he is asked to apostasize, to
trample on an image of the face of Christ. If he does, the torture of his fellow
believers will end. He will spare them that-and quite possibly keep them from
themselves committing the mortal sin of apostasy. And when he finally does it,
steps upon the face of Christ, he does it in the name of love. He believes, in
fact, that the face of the bronze Christ urges him on, saying: "Trample! Trample!
I more than anyone know of the pain in your foot. Trample! It was to be trampled
on by men that I was born into this world. It was to share men's pain that I
carried my crosS."22 What if, one may ask Newman, one "wilful untruth" can
prevent the "starvation in extremest agony" of millions? Or, what if the telling
of one "wilful untruth" can prevent many more such untruths from being told?
Many wonder whether such a price is not worth paying. And it may seem that
any person genuinely moved by "love" could not refuse to dirty his hands by
doing an evil deed whose results were so good. In a moment we will consider
what Newman refuses to grant that there might be circumstances in which one
should do such an evil deed. But first we must understand the reason why
Newman is essentially right, how it is that he articulates a concern that must be
central in Christian ethics.
From an impersonal standpoint our actions can perhaps be regarded as just a
certain kind of event in the world, but as moral agents-as creatures made for
communion in love with God-we can never so regard them. Our actions are
not simply events in the world; they are occasions in which to come upon
ourselves, to learn as we can in no other way who we are. 23 They permit us to
see whether we trust God to care for us and for the world he has made--or
whether we have shouldered that burden ourselves. To aim at evil, even in a
good cause, is to take into our person a choice against what is good-not just
to let this happen, but to invest it with the personal involvement of our purpose. 24
It is to begin to make of ourselves people who would not want to be with God.
This is what must be said in defense of Newman. This is why he is essentially
correct.
Having said that, we can grant that moral rules are never likely to be as simple
and straightforward as they at first seem. Exceptional cases will present them-
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selves, and such cases are often offered in support of a consequentialist ethic.
Many exceptional cases are less problematic than they may seem, however; they
simply suggest the need for complexity and exception-clauses in the moral rules
we adopt. (And Newman has not failed to see this. What he absolutely disavows,
for example, is that anyone should steal a farthing without excuse.) The more
troubling cases are rarer but deeply disturbing. Michael Walzer has termed them
instances of "supreme emergency" and, discussing in particular the morality of
warfare, has characterized them in terms of a twofold necessity.25 Even though,
according to Walzer, the rules of war should not ordinarily be broken even in
a good cause, the supreme emergency presents a situation in which we must do
so (though without denying that we incur guilt in doing so). An emergency is
"supreme" when it is both morally and strategically necessary to break the moral
rule for the sake of the desired outcome. Morally necessary-if it is imperative
that we achieve our end, imperative because failure here would mean not just
the loss of certain goods but acquiescence to the rule of evil. Strategically
necessary-because it must be true that no other way of resisting this evil presents
itself to us.
Some will argue that to permit the possibility of an exception even in such
circumstances must inevitably undermine the non-consequentialist character of
an ethic. 26 This might be true if the overriding of moral principle countenanced
in the moment of supreme emergency were justified on consequentialist grounds.
But Walzer offers no such justification; nor do I. Instead, his categories of moral
and strategic necessity seek to describe the moment in which necessity truly has
us in its grip--the moment when either we accept the rule of evil or, refusing
to do that, invest evil with the involvement of our own purpose. A moment, in
short, in which we are no longer free---except to cry out as Augustine's wise
judge would: "Deliver me from my necessities. "27 The evil deed can still be done
in such a moment as an act of trust, but only if this prayer is uttered also. Thus,
the moment of supreme emergency, like what Charles Fried has called the
catastrophic as an ethical category, identifies a moment of necessity for which
our usual categories of moral judgment are no longer sufficient. 2s Walzer's
characterization of the moment of supreme emergency is, necessarily, general.
And although some might wish that it be made more precise, there is good moral
reason why it cannot be. In such circumstances the agent ought to face an internal
struggle between the demands of morality and the hard chains of necessity. If
moralists were able to specify justifying conditions in advance, this strugglewhich is essentially the struggle to trust God-would not have to take place. 29
The Christian is called in every circumstance of life to trust God. This call
delivers us from the tyranny which requires that we be something more than
finite beings, that we always seek to produce what is (impersonally considered)
the best overall outcome. But this call does more than free us from the pursuit
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of good consequences; it also limits the ways in which we may do so. We are
not to seek the good by doing evil, by acting in ways which manifest our failure
to trust God to care for us and the world, by seeking to take upon ourselves the
burden of a divine providential governance. That is why a Christian ethic need
not be consequentialist and must not be. And if a moment of supreme emergency
should arise, the Christian can and will offer no justification for overriding the
moral rules which bind us to our neighbors and thereby limit us. The Christian
must seek no impersonal standpoint from which to be justified in such a decision.
If we are truly caught in the web of necessity, we must act. But if while acting
we do not fail in trust, we will indeed-as Augustine saw-pray for deliverance
from the God who is not bound by our necessities.
IV: Is God a Consequentialist?
More than half a century before Godwin wrote his Political Justice, Joseph
Butler, one of the great English moralists, argued that the moral obligation of
human beings was not to produce the greatest good possible but to do good
within the limits and restrictions placed upon us by moral law. Butler's reason
for believing this was theological, and he did not attempt to understand human
nature or our moral responsibilities in isolation from the Creator upon whom
our life depends. "The happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the
Lord and Proprietor of it; nor do we know what we are about when we endeavour
to promote the good of mankind in any ways but those which He has directed,
that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice. "30 Human beings
are not, Butler claimed, free to determine their moral responsibilities from a
purely impersonal standpoint. They are always located in nature and history,
and to be thus located is part of what it means to be human. Butler was willing
to consider the "supposition" that God might himself be a consequentialist, but
that would mean only that God had thought it best on the whole for us not to
be and had created us as beings whose freedom to seek the good was morally
limited.
.
The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn
falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others abstracted from all consideration,
which conduct is likely to produce an overbalance of happiness or
misery; and therefore, were the Author of Nature to propose nothing to
Himself as an end but the production of happiness, were His moral
character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that
supposition indeed the only reason of His giving us the above mentioned
approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and
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disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence and injustice, must
be that He foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce more
happiness than fonning us with a temper of mere general benevolence.
But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice,
must be vice in us, and benevolence to some preferably to others, virtue,
abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good
which they may appear likely to produce. 31
The movement from Butler to Godwin's statement that "that life ought to be
preferred which will be most conducive to the general good" represents in some
ways the tendency of modem moral theory. And it is a movement from a
conception of human beings as creatures always in relation to God and therefore
always limited in certain ways to a quite different vision of the human agent as
the godlike bearer of an unlimited responsibility for producing good results.
J. B. Schneewind has sketched the "story" of the rise of modem moral philosophy in a way that suggests such a theological point. 32 He notes that the moral
philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries took place against the background of
a received and still deeply held-even if now also deeply challenged-belief in
the just and good providential governance of God. The production of good at
which the moral life aimed was in no sense anyone's solo effort; rather, it was
a cooperative endeavor. Each was to carry out the tasks given him and to respect
the moral law that tied his life together with others in various bonds, and this
could be done in the confidence that one thereby played one's part in the overall
enterprise whose final purposes were God's alone to determine. "Thus,"
Schneewind writes, "no [human] agent has a task properly described as producing
the good." Since human beings never fully understand the final goal and the
particular contributions different agents make to it, they are never in a position
to accept the governance of this entire cooperative undertaking-never in a
position to take control of the course of history. "Hence, for us our duties must
always have an absolute deontic status, although-as Butler points out---God
may well be utilitarian and may understand the laws of morality in that sense."
But what happens if these religious beliefs begin to fade? It is not hard to see
how it should be that, for people who remain morally serious but lack the religious
underpinnings once provided by Christian culture, consequentialism should seem
a quite natural moral theory. This is the plot of Schneewind's story.
Suppose the aim of the enterprise is human happiness, rather than cosmic
displays of God's glory: then we can begin to understand the goal.
Suppose God no longer intervenes in particular cases in the world: then
we cannot be sure He will make up for failures by our fellows; then
each of us has some degree of responsibility of see to it that the end is
indeed brought about by doing our duty. The absolute deontic status is
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gone; we are required, morally, to judge to some extent by results.
Thus, the inner logic of a cooperative venture carries us toward
utilitarianism as an explanation.

If God is not available to produce the best overall outcome, and if it is important
for human wellbeing that someone accept this responsibility, then human beings
themselves are the most likely candidates. And so we succumb to the serpent's
temptation in the name of responsible love.
At the same time, the old rules which govern the bonds of human cooperation
will remain; they will exercise some claim over us even though we will not
always be able to demonstrate that they serve to produce what is best overall.
These rules may, therefore, come to seem rather puzzling and mysterious, since
it will be hard for creatures who have accepted a godlike role to understand why
they should accept any limits on their freedom to produce the good.
Thus, we have learned to deal with the tension between the good and the right
in quite a different manner than did Butler. This tension-between the worthwhile
results we seek to produce in and for the lives of others, and the moral limits
on how we are to act-is a permanent one in human history. If we try to eliminate
it, we seek, in a sense, to save ourselves. But pride and trust will understand it
differently. For the heart that trusts God, the tension is always occasion for
temptation-a moment of danger in which, seeing that the fruit of the tree is
good for food, we will be tempted to eat of it. For the proud heart that would
be like God, the tension will seem a call to the daring and responsible exercise
of human freedom. But, in fact, this is only the illusion of responsibility, and
the proud heart lives a lie. "If, as consequentialism holds, we were indeed equally
morally responsible for an infinite radiation of concentric circles originating from
the center point of some action, then while it might look as if we were enlarging
the scope of human responsibility and thus the significance of personality, the
enlargement would be greater than we could support. "33 Pride makes war on the
truth of the universe and must therefore end with no-thing, not even genuine
human responsibility.
The first article of the Christian creed locates human beings in nature and
history-beings who are limited and dependent creatures, even if also free to an
indefinite degree from the constraints of time and space. The second article of
that creed affirms that the Father who has fixed the bounds of our habitation
has-to use the philosophers' language for the moment-given his Son into
death for the general wellbeing. And if the first article of the creed seems to
restrict the means by which we may pursue what is best, the second article seems
to depict a divine love which, if it serves as our example, might make consequentialists of us all. We can perhaps discern here a deeper reason why the tension
between the right and the good cannot be eliminated from our world. It reflects
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not only our nature as both free and finite but also God's action on our behalf
in creation and redemption.
We may doubt, though, whether Butler's "supposition" is anything more than
an interesting thought experiment. For the God of the Christian creed is not
precisely a consequentialist--one who seeks what is best by adopting an impersonal perspective from which to manipulate our doings. He is a lover, who enters
into our nature and history and never fails to love those whom he meets here.
If the Father gives his Son into death, it is also true that the Son willingly takes
up this vocation and enacts it without failing in trust. This means that in his
sovereign freedom God takes our finite being into himself, suffers its tensions,
and overcomes them. For that reason we trust him; for that reason we do not
seek to understand the meaning of neighbor-love apart from such trust; and for
that reason we live in hope. It may be, indeed, that moral theory needs hope if
trust and love are to be understood properly. Moral theory needs the hope that
God can complete what remains incomplete in our limited strivings and can be
trusted to work for good in everything. Without such hope we may be hard
pressed to resist the lure of consequentialism. But when the Christian virtues of
trust, love, and hope mutually interpenetrate our character, we may recognize
in consequentialist moral theory the voice of the serpent. And even if for most
of us most of the time a theoretical mistake in moral theory is not the greatest
danger that lies in wait, it's still true that we are given here an opportunity to
enact our own trust by loving God, as we are commanded, with the mind.
Oberlin College
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